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Abstract 
This paper uses annual aggregate data for 36 low or middle income countries covering the 
period 1995-2001 to investigate the effect of FDI on private investment. It also explores if the 
relationship between FDI and private investment is influenced by the nature of the political 
regime, using four governance measures (voice and accountability, regulatory quality, political 
stability, and control of corruption) to distinguish between ‘market-friendly’ (high or good 
governance values) and ‘market-unfriendly’ (low governance) regimes. The results, which hold 
for all of the governance measures, show that private investment is more important than FDI in 
terms of the contribution to total investment, and that FDI inflows and private investment are 
higher in countries with good governance. Interestingly, the findings demonstrate that FDI tends 
to displace domestic private investment, and this ‘crowding out’ effect is greater in countries 
with good governance. 
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1 Introduction 
Investment is a key determinant of economic growth, and alternative sources of 
investment finance can have different effects on total investment (depending on how 
they relate to each other, and how each responds to market characteristics). A private 
agent in a developing country considering undertaking an investment has open to them 
three principal means of financing. First, they can consider domestic financing, either 
borrowing on domestic markets or accessing funds from family or other informal 
sources. Second, they can seek a foreign partner and attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Finally, they can seek to borrow abroad for foreign debt financing. An important 
concern in assessing the impact of a particular source of financing on total investment is 
whether it adds to or substitutes for alternative sources of investment finance. This 
paper concentrates on the relationship between FDI and private investment in a sample 
of 36 developing countries in the 1990s. 
In evaluating the impact of FDI on economic growth in a developing country the 
question arises whether FDI crowds in or displaces domestic investment? Although this 
is an important issue, there are surprisingly few empirical studies of the impact of FDI 
on domestic investment in developing countries (Nunnenkamp 2004). If FDI crowds out 
domestic investment, total private investment rises by less than the FDI and the benefits 
for the country are reduced (Mišun and Tomšík 2002 find evidence for crowding-out in 
Poland in the 1990s). If FDI crowds in (stimulates) private investment, total investment 
increases by more than the FDI and the benefits are enhanced. Mišun and Tomšík 
(2002) find crowding in for Hungary and the Czech Republic in the 1990s; Kim and Seo 
(2003) find that FDI crowds in domestic investment in South Korea for the period 1985-
99. It may be the case that FDI and domestic private investment are effectively 
independent. Agosin and Machado (2005) find that FDI has no significant effect on 
domestic private investment for countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America over 1971-
2000, although there seems to be crowding out of domestic investment by FDI in Latin 
America in some sub-periods.  
The relative importance of alternative sources of financing for private investment, and 
how they interact, may be influenced by the quality of governance (as an indicator of 
how market friendly the political regime is). Existing studies either do not include 
governance variables, or do not consider that governance may affect the relationship 
between alternative sources of financing private investment in developing countries. 
Political uncertainty and poor governance (such as weak property rights, high corruption 
or excessive regulation) have been found to discourage domestic private investment and 
FDI (Mauro 1995; Campos et al. 1999). This paper considers whether, in addition, the 
relationship between FDI and private investment is affected by the nature of the 
political regimes. We characterize regimes with high (good) values of governance 
indicators as market-friendly or favourable to investment, while regimes with low 
values of governance are market-unfriendly or unfavourable to investment. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical motivation for a 
link between political regime and the source of private investment, and reviews the 
existing literature on FDI and domestic investment. Section 3 discusses the data and 
empirical specification and presents the results of the analysis of the relationship 
between private investment and FDI under different governance regimes using annual 
data for 36 low or middle income countries over 1995-2001. Section 4 provides 
conclusions and discusses implications for financing private investment.   2
2  Political regimes and sources of investment finance 
It is well established in the literature that institutions are a significant determinant of 
both FDI and domestic investment in developing countries (Blonigen 2005; Dawson 
1998). In particular, political instability has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on domestic investment in developing countries (Gyimah-Brempong et al. 1999; 
Rogoff and Reinhart 2003). On a related theme, corruption (associated with poor 
governance) increases costs of production and discourages domestic investment (Mauro 
1995; Campos et al. 1999; Wei and Wu 2001). Protection of property rights reduces 
risks and increases investment (Li and Resnick 2003). However, Hausmann and 
Fernández-Arias (2000) argue that the share of FDI in total capital flows tends to be 
larger in countries that are riskier, financially underdeveloped and institutionally weak; 
the share of FDI in investment is not a reliable predictor of good governance. 
There are various ways of distinguishing the nature of political regimes, and one 
possible issue to consider is the policy stance towards markets and incentives or support 
provided to the private sector. Regimes that are more market-oriented and supportive of 
the private sector are likely to be more attractive to private investors. Dalmazzo and 
Marini (2000) consider the choice of investment finance under political uncertainty, 
where a ‘market-friendly’ regime is defined as one where the probability of a populist 
regime (one that is labour-friendly or capital-unfriendly) coming to power is effectively 
zero. A ‘market-unfriendly’ regime is one where there is a positive probability of a 
populist regime coming to power.  
Dalmazzo and Marini (2000) provide a model that generates predictions on the relative 
importance of three different sources of investment financing – domestic capital self-
financing (DSF), FDI financing (FDI) and foreign debt financing (FDF) – under 
political uncertainty. As their concern is with the effect of uncertainty, they derive 
results under a politically unstable regime (i.e., where there is a positive probability of a 
populist government being in power after investment decisions are made). The 
implication of political instability is that private investors will seek out foreign partners 
(FDI) or lenders (FDF) who can exert pressure on the government to protect the value 
of the investment.  
A foreign partner can impose sanctions whenever the country considered violates some 
international agreement. For this reason, entering into an agreement with a foreign 
investor or lender can provide some protection to domestic capitalists should a populist 
(or market-unfriendly) regime gain power. Thus, the more likely is a populist 
government, the greater the incentive for foreign financing over domestic financing. If 
the capitalist sells the project to a foreign investor (FDI) and a market-unfriendly 
government comes into office, the foreign investor can demand the application of 
(trade) sanctions against the country. If the capitalist borrows abroad to finance the 
project (FDF) and a market-unfriendly government comes into office, any attempted 
repudiation of the outstanding debt obligations make the country liable to sanctions. The 
capitalist remains in full control of the project or the populist government decides to 
default, leading to sanctions. In either case, the capitalist (domestic investor) has greater 
bargaining power than under domestic financing. 
To suggest hypotheses regarding the importance of each source of financing under 
favourable (market-friendly) and unfavourable (market-unfriendly) regimes for 
investment, Görg et al. (2007) solve the model also for politically stable regimes (i.e.,   3
where there is a zero probability of a populist government). Görg et al. (2007) 
summarize the predicted ‘ranking’ of sources of finance under each regime in terms of 
the relative impact on the level of private investment. Foreign sources of financing are 
attractive because they confer protection to investors, so (FDF and FDI) will be more 
attractive than domestic finance under market-unfriendly regimes. Under market-
friendly regimes, the model predicts that foreign borrowing will be the most attractive 
source of financing, but there will be indifference between FDI and private domestic 
financing. The broad conclusion is that foreign financing will be relatively more 
attractive than domestic financing under unfavourable as compared to favourable 
regimes; in respect of FDI, this is consistent with Hausmann and Fernández-Arias 
(2000). 
The effect of FDI on total (private) investment depends on several factors, including 
recipient country business environment and economic policy, types of FDI and the 
strength of domestic firms, but is also influenced by the relationship between FDI and 
domestic private investment. FDI that brings in goods and services that are new to a 
host country (particularly in high technology) usually has favourable (crowding in) 
effects on capital formation (Agosin and Mayer 2000). On the other hand, FDI in 
sectors competing with domestic companies reduces investment opportunities for 
domestic investors (Mišun and Tomšík 2002). The contribution to total capital 
formation of such FDI is likely to be less than the FDI flow itself (crowding out effect). 
Even where FDI does not displace private investment, FDI may not stimulate new 
downstream or upstream production and so may fail to exert a positive effect on private 
investment (Agosin and Machado 2005). Potential spillovers from FDI to domestic 
firms may not be sufficient to stimulate private domestic investment; the contribution of 
FDI to technology transfer may be largely restricted to subsidiaries (Almeida and 
Fernandes 2008), and spillovers may not significantly improve efficiency of domestic 
firms (Girma and Gong 2008). 
In countries with good governance (e.g., political stability, low corruption, strong 
property rights), levels of private investment and FDI will be higher than in countries 
with poor governance. However, the FDI impact on private investment can be either 
positive or negative, depending on the strength and capability of domestic producers (to 
compete with, supply to or absorb spillovers from FDI) and the type of FDI (such as 
resource extraction or export manufacturing). Strong linkages reinforce the crowding in 
effect, whereas crowding out is more likely if FDI is in the form of M&A (Nunnenkamp 
2004).  
Most studies addressing the impact of FDI on the level of (total) private investment for 
developing countries are based on cross-country data. Borensztein et al. (1998) test the 
impact of FDI on domestic investment for 69 developing countries over the period 
1970-89. They find that FDI stimulates total investment so that FDI crowds in domestic 
investment (but results are not robust to model specification). Agosin and Mayer (2000) 
develop a model of investment in developing countries to determine the long-term 
crowding in and crowding out effect of FDI on domestic investment. Agosin and 
Machado (2005) apply the model to panel data for the period 1971-2000 for 12 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. They find that FDI displaces domestic 
investment in Latin America but is independent in Africa and Asia (total investment 
increases by the amount of FDI); the crowding out effect of FDI in Latin America 
appears restricted to the 1970s, and may be present in Africa in the 1990s.    4
A positive impact of FDI on domestic investment is not assured; in some cases, total 
investment increase by less than FDI, as Agosin and Mayer (2000), Agosin and 
Machado (2005) and Mišun and Tomšík (2002) find. None of these studies consider 
specifically how the political regime (governance) may influence the relationship 
between domestic private investment and FDI. The findings in Appendix A suggest that 
good governance stimulates both private investment and FDI, but the remainder of the 
paper focuses on the impact of FDI on domestic private investment under different 
regimes for investment. 
3  Empirical specification and results 
The sample comprises 36 low and middle income countries, 13 in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 8 in Asia, 10 in Europe (mostly transition economies) and 5 in Africa 
(see Appendix A). The period covered in 1995-2001 as the governance data used are 
only available since 1995. Following Agosin and Machado (2005) we begin with the 
identity: total investment (It) = domestic investment (Id,t) + FDI (Ft), expressed more 
generally as (where G is growth of real output): 
 I t = f (Gt-1, Gt-2, Id,t-1, Id,t-2, Ft, Ft-1, Ft-2) [1] 
As one cannot estimate an underlying identity, a reduced form behavioural relationship 
including governance indicators (GI) is used to analyse the FDI effect on private 
investment in a manner similar to Driffield and Hughes (2003): 
PVi,t = β0 + β1Gi,t-1 + β2PUBi,t-1 + β3SDEBTi,t-1 + β4FDIi,t-1 +  β5GI + β6GI*FDIi,t-1  + 
μi +  t i, ε        [2] 
Variables are measured as percentages of GDP and PVi,t is private investment, FDIi,t is 
net FDI inflows,1 PUBi,t-1 is public investment and SDEBTi,t-1 is private external debt 
stock. Four governance indicators (GI) are used: voice and accountability (VA), 
political stability and absence of violence (PS), regulatory quality (RQ), and control of 
corruption (CC). The binary variable GI (= VA, PS, RQ, CC) is equal to 1 if the country 
has a ‘high’ value of the governance indicator and 0 otherwise; μi is a country specific 
time invariant effect, and εi,t is the remaining white noise error. All independent 
variables are lagged one period (year).2 Appendix A discusses the investment and 
governance data, with descriptive statistics and analysis of the contribution of 
alternative sources of finance to total investment. 
In estimating [2], we expect a positive coefficient on real GDP growth, i.e., the 
propensity for private investment should tend to be increasing in income. The effects of 
public investment and external debt are a priori unknown, as the coefficients can be 
either positive or negative. We are especially interested in the estimated coefficient on 
                                                 
1  The foreign investor’s share must exceed 10% to be FDI, and the intention can be either greenfield or 
‘merger and acquisition’ (M&A) investment. 
2  This serves a number of purposes – partially accounts for potential endogeneity and allows for the 
explanatory variables taking time to influence private investment (behaviour).    5
FDI inflows, which can also be either positive or negative, and how this coefficient (i.e., 
the FDI effect on private investment) is affected by the inclusion of governance 
indicators. 
Fixed and random effects estimators are used to allow for unobserved country-specific 
factors. If there is a correlation between country specific factors (unobserved specific 
effects) and the explanatory variable(s) the fixed effects model (FE) generates 
consistent estimators. If the correlation is zero, the random effects (RE) model generates 
consistent and efficient estimators (FE estimates are consistent but inefficient).  The 
Hausman test is used to select between the alternative estimators (Wooldridge 2002) 
and supports the RE model in our case (the Koenker-Bassett and LM tests suggest that 
the estimates are efficient and consistent). A robustness check of regional effects on the 
private investment impact of FDI is conducted by dividing the countries into four 
regions: Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America.  
Table 1 presents estimation results using RE for the sample period 1995-2001 (further 
results are available in Görg et al. 2007). The first column excludes governance 
variables, introduced individually in subsequent columns. The coefficient on (lagged) 
real GDP growth is positive and significant, consistent with Cardoso (1993) and 
Oshikoya (1994), at 0.29 in all cases. The coefficient on (lagged) FDI is consistently 
negative and statistically significant with a very similar value in all regressions; FDI 
appears to ‘crowd out’ private investment in developing countries, as Agosin and 
Machado (2005) found. The other explanatory variables, notably the four measures of 
governance, are not statistically significant. 
The estimated equation is not a log-linear model so the estimated coefficients are not 
elasticities. To clarify the effects, we evaluate the coefficients at mean values of 
variables. On average, a 10 per cent increase in (real) economic growth is associated 
with a 0.6 per cent increase in private investment (as a share of GDP), holding all other 
variables constant. A 10 per cent increase in FDI/GDP is associated with a 0.5 per cent 
fall in private investment. 
The governance indicators themselves appear to have no effect on the level of private 
investment, i.e., no intercept effect in Table 1, but may affect the slope with respect to 
FDI. To test if the relationship between FDI and private investment differs under 
favourable regimes for investment (when GI = 1) interactive terms are included. The 
results in Table 2 (RE estimation) confirm the previous significant coefficients on G and 
FDI, but show that political regimes (or governance) appear to matter as both intercept 
and slope effects are significant. Taking the voice and accountability (VA) indicator as 
an example, the estimate of the extra private investment in ‘high’ compared to ‘low’ VA 
countries is 5.6; the intercept coefficient is similar for the other GI measures. On 
average, private investment as a percentage of GDP in favourable regimes is six 
percentage points higher than in unfavourable regimes, ceteris paribus. This confirms 
that the level of private investment is higher under business-friendly regimes for 
investment, as found in Mauro (1995), Dawson (1998), Gyimah-Brempong et al. (1999) 
and Campos et al. (1999).   6
Table 1: FDI and private investment: random effects estimates, 1995-2001 
Dependent variable: PV/GDP  
Variables 
Governance indicator (GI) 
none  VA PS  RQ CC 
G (-1)  0.29 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
SDEBT (-1)   0.03 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
PUB (-1)  -0.03 
(0.87) 
0.04 
(0.84) 
-0.01 
(0.98) 
0.03 
(0.88) 
0.03 
(0.84) 
FDI (-1)  -0.26 
(0.02) 
-0.28 
(0.01) 
-0.28 
(0.01) 
-0.28 
(0.01) 
-0.27 
(0.02) 
Constant  14.37 
(0.00) 
13.04 
(0.00) 
13.48 
(0.00) 
12.58 
(0.00) 
12.88 
(0.00) 
GI   1.99 
(0.16) 
1.72 
(0.21) 
2.43 
(0.19) 
2.91 
(0.13) 
R
2  0.69  0.72 0.71  0.74 0.75 
Hausman test statistic 
0.76 
(0.94) 
1.12 
(0.89) 
1.32 
(0.86) 
0.98 
(0.91) 
0.31 
(0.99) 
Koenker-Bassett test statistic  
0.05 
(0.20) 
0.06 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
0.05 
(0.16) 
LM test (Chi-squared) statistic  1.24  1.86 1.90  1.89 1.16 
Number of observations  216  216  216  216  216 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are P-values (significant coefficients in bold). The 5% critical 
value of the chi-squared distribution with four degrees of freedom is 9.49, so the Hausman test 
statistic shows that the RE model is preferred over FE. The Koenker-Bassett statistic suggests 
that heteroscedasticity is not a problem and the LM test implies no evidence of autocorrelation 
(the 5% critical value of Chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom is 3.84). 
The interaction (slope) terms are also significant and suggest that the crowding-out 
effect of FDI is greater in high GI countries – the interaction terms reinforce the 
negative coefficient on FDI. For example, in ‘low’ VA countries, an increase in 
FDI/GDP by 10 percentage points displaces private investment/GDP by 1.4 percentage 
points (β4) whilst in ‘high’ VA countries each extra 10 percentage points of FDI/GDP 
‘crowds out’ private investment/GDP by 1.8 percentage points (β4 + β9). Similar effects 
are observed for the other GI measures, although the FDI crowding-out effect is more 
pronounced in high GI countries using the PS and CC measures. Private investment 
overall is nevertheless higher in high GI countries, as the positive intercept effect 
exceeds the negative FDI effect, even if FDI is higher in high GI countries (see Table 
A1).  
Two results are striking. First, the intercept term is only significant when the interaction 
term is also included. Furthermore, the intercept term has a high value relative to the 
difference in mean levels of PV/GDP between high and low GI countries (Table A1). 
This suggests that FDI plays an important role in the relationship between political 
regime and private investment. Second, FDI has a greater crowding out effect on private 
investment in high as compared to low GI countries. This suggests the nature of the 
relationship: the features of favourable regimes (good governance) that promote private   7
Table 2: Political regime, FDI and private investment: RE, 1995-2001 
Dependent variable: PV/GDP  
Variables 
Governance indicator (GI) 
VA PS  RQ  CC 
G (-1) [ 1]  0.26 (0.00)  0.25 (0.00)  0.27 (0.00)  0.29 (0.00) 
SDEBT (-1) [ 2]  0.01 (0.54)  0.02 (0.28)  0.01 (0.59)  0.03 (0.13) 
PUB (-1) [ 3]  -0.04 (0.81)  -0.08 (0.62)  -0.05 (0.76)  -0.01 (0.96) 
FDI (-1) [ 4]  -0.14 (0.07)  -0.12 (0.05)  -0.11 (0.07)  -0.16 (0.09) 
Constant  13.29 (0.00)  13.40 (0.00)  12.72 (0.00)  12.76 (0.00) 
VA [ 5]  5.69  (0.00)     
PS [ 6]   5.87 (0.01)    
RQ [ 7]     5.86 (0.04)   
CC [ 8]       6.18 (0.00) 
VA*FDI (-1) [ 9]  -0.04 (0.03)     
PS*FDI (-1) [ 10]   -0.10 (0.02)    
RQ*FDI (-1) [ 11]     -0.02 (0.06)   
CC*FDI (-1) [ 12]       -0.08 (0.04) 
R
2  0.88  0.82 0.90 0.82 
Hausman test statistic  4.84 (0.45)  2.30 (0.81)  4.06 (0.54)  6.90 (0.23) 
Koenker-Bassett test 
statistic  
0.12 (0.23)  0.13 (0.20)  0.16 (0.25)  0.11 (0.26) 
LM test (Chi-squared) 
statistic 
2.64  2.18 2.02 2.71 
Chi-squared test:  
H0:  4 =  4 +  9;  4 =  4 +  10;  4 
=  4 +  11;  4 =  4 +  12 
0.41 
(0.53) 
0.53 
(0.44) 
0.89 
(0.35) 
0.60 
(0.40) 
Number of observations  216  216  216  216 
 
Notes: As for Table 1. The Chi-squared test supports the equal FDI effect on private investment 
in both regimes: the 5 per cent critical value of Chi-squared distribution with one degree of 
freedom is 3.84.  
investment also attract FDI; at a margin, FDI and private investors compete over 
attractive investment opportunities, so FDI displaces local investment. In this context it 
is interesting that public investment and debt are insignificant (Cohen 1991 also finds 
that external debt has no impact on the investment). Economic growth is the only other 
significant explanatory variable (and the coefficient is consistent for all GI measures). 
Domestic investment responds to economic growth (Cardoso 1993; Oshikoya 1994) and 
so does FDI, but opportunities are limited.  
In all estimations, Koenker-Bassett and LM tests are used to check for problems of 
heteroscedasticity and (first-order) autocorrelation: if the errors (from the RE model) are 
not independent and identically distributed the estimators are inefficient (but still 
consistent). In all estimated equations, the nulls of no heteroscedasticity or (first-order) 
autocorrelation are accepted so the estimators are consistent and efficient. It is possible   8
that past private investment could influence current private investment (Driffield and 
Hughes 2003) so that a dynamic panel estimator is appropriate. As the LM tests clearly 
accept the null of no autocorrelation a dynamic model (with one lagged endogenous 
variable as an additional independent variable in the model) is not required (Carstensen 
and Toubal 2004).  
Regional effects for the FDI impact on domestic investment 
The impact of FDI on private investment may vary across regions, and such variations 
may be related to governance. To test this, the econometric model to be estimated is 
specified as follows: 
PVi,t  = β0 + β1GGDPi,t-1 + β2PUBi,t-1 + β3SDEBTi,t-1 + β4FDIi,t-1 +  β5ASIA + 
β6AFRICA + β7EUROPE  + β8ASIA*FDIi,t-1  + β9AFRICA*FDIi,t-1 + 
β10EUROPE*FDIi,t-1 + μi +  t i, ε                   [3] 
All variables are as previously defined (and lagged one year) except ASIA is a dummy 
variable that is 1 for Asian countries and 0 otherwise, AFRICA is a dummy variable that 
is 1 for African countries and 0 otherwise, EUROPE is a dummy variable that is 1 for 
European countries and 0 otherwise (Latin America is the omitted or reference region).  
Table 3 provides RE results (as supported by the Hausman test). The coefficients on real 
GDP growth (positive) and FDI/GDP (negative) are statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level in all specifications (as previously). None of the regional intercept dummies 
are statistically significant. i.e., there appear to be no regional effects on the level of 
private investment. When regional interaction effects with FDI are included, however, 
both intercept and slope dummies become significant. 
The results affirm the significance of economic growth in encouraging private 
investment (as found in the previous literature), and the coefficient is remarkably robust 
across all specifications (tables). Public investment and external debt appear to have no 
impact on private investment. As could be expected, the level of private investment is 
significantly higher (positive intercept dummies) in Asia and Europe relative to Latin 
America (the Africa effect is insignificant). Note that regional effects on private 
investment are not evidently related to governance as all regions have high and low 
governance countries (see Appendix A). 
As previously, FDI appears to ‘crowd out’ private investment (a negative and 
significant coefficient). The interaction terms are all negative and significant suggesting 
that, relative to Latin America, the crowding out effect is greater in Asia, Europe and 
Africa (the coefficient is roughly doubled in all cases). As observed above, these 
regional effects are unlikely to be explained by governance scores directly as all regions 
have high and low governance countries. It is possible that the tendency for investment 
and FDI to be higher in high governance countries is more pronounced (i.e., within 
region differences are greater) in Asia and Europe compared to Latin America, 
especially as the former two regions have significantly higher levels of investment. In 
this case, the interaction term may be driven by the high governance (and investment)   9
Table 3: FDI and private investment: regional effects, 1995-2001 
Dependent variable: PV/GDP  
Variables 
Random effects 
1 2  3 
G (-1) [ 1]  0.29 (0.00)  0.29 (0.00)  0.29 (0.00) 
SDEBT/GDP (-1) [ 2]  0.03 (0.14)  0.02 (0.30)  0.02 (0.36) 
PUB/GDP (-1) [ 3]  -0.03 (0.87)  -0.03 (0.89)  -0.03 (0.84) 
FDI/GDP (-1) [ 4]  -0.26 (0.02)  -0.27 (0.01)  -0.15 (0.06) 
Constant  14.37 (0.00)  13.82 (0.00) 12.61  (0.00) 
ASIA [ 5]   1.63  (0.41)  4.46 (0.03) 
AFRICA [ 6]    -1.54 (0.47)  1.18 (0.60) 
EUROPE [ 7]   1.86  (0.27)  7.24 (0.00) 
ASIA*FDI/GDP (-1) [ 8]     -0.16 (0.05) 
AFRICA*FDI/GDP (-1) [ 9]     -0.19 (0.09) 
EUROPE*FDI/GDP (-1) [ 10]     -0.12 (0.02) 
R
2 0.69  0.74  0.92 
Hausman test statistic  0.76 (0.94) 1.80  (0.77)  9.27  (0.24) 
Koenker-Bassett test statistic   0.05 (0.20)  0.04 (0.13)  0.04 (0.17) 
LM test (Chi-squared) statistic 1.24  2.47  2.01 
Chi-squared test: H0:  4 =  4 +  8     0.39  (0.51) 
Chi-squared test: H0:  4 =  4 +  9     0.51  (0.46) 
Chi-squared test: H0:  4 =  4 +  10     0.81  (0.35) 
Number of observations  216  216  216 
Notes: As for Table 2. The Koenker-Bassett and LM tests indicate no heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation problems. 
countries in each region, and this is consistent with the earlier results that crowding out 
is more pronounced in countries with better governance (presumably because of 
competition for the marginal projects). As Africa would be expected to have lower 
governance, on average, than Latin America, the greater crowding out may seem 
surprising. However, the coefficient is only just significant, the small African sample is 
not representative of the poorer sub-Saharan African countries (it comprises Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia), and again the result may reflect 
the high governance and investment countries in the sample (Mauritius, South Africa 
and, for most measures, Tunisia). 
4 Concluding  remarks 
The paper investigates the effect of FDI on domestic private investment under different 
governance regimes using the World Bank’s governance indicators on annual aggregate 
data over the period 1995-2001 for 36 low and middle income countries. Given the 
relatively short period and heterogeneous sample, the results should be considered no 
more than indicative. Nevertheless, some consistent findings emerge:   10
1.  In developing and transition countries, domestic private investment is more 
important than FDI in terms of contribution to total investment.  
2.  Total domestic private investment and FDI are higher under market-friendly 
regimes (those with high governance scores). Governments that provide a 
business-friendly environment for investors do appear to achieve higher level of 
investment, as might be expected. 
3.  As expected, economic growth encourages FDI and private investment. Public 
investment and external debt do not appear to have any effect on private 
investment. 
4.  FDI tends to crowd out domestic private investment, and this ‘crowding out’ 
effect is greater in countries with high governance scores, and lower in Latin 
America compared to Asia, Europe and Africa (in the sample).  
Only the last of these findings can be considered surprising; crowding out implies that 
total investment increases by less than the FDI, as other private investment is reduced, 
so why should this effect appear more pronounced in high governance countries? A 
plausible explanation is because levels of investment (private and FDI) are greater under 
high governance, competition for profitable opportunities is greater and, at the margin, 
foreign investors command the better opportunities. Foreign firms can increase the costs 
to local firms of obtaining finance or employing skilled labour (Kumar 2003). If foreign 
firms have a productivity advantage over their domestic counterparts, it is likely that 
they will be willing to pay higher prices for capital goods. A possible result (in 
industries with significant foreign penetration) is that the cost of capital goods will 
increase in the domestic sector, and investment by domestic firms will decline (Driffield 
and Hughes 2003). 
A common assumption that underpins policy toward FDI in most developing countries – 
that a liberal policy toward FDI is sufficient to ensure crowding in (Agosin and Mayer 
2000) – is not supported by the analysis, to the extent that higher governance scores and 
growth are associated with more liberal policies towards FDI. There are market failures 
in the investment process and differences between foreign and domestic investors, 
suggesting a role for government intervention to regulate, attract or promote specific 
types of FDI (Kumar 2003). For FDI to help achieve the development goals of 
increasing economic growth and raising domestic investment, two policies are helpful 
(Nunnenkamp 2004). First, developing countries, especially those with weak 
governance and institutions, need to be attractive to foreign investors. They could 
reduce barriers to entry and promote a better business environment; these will attract 
foreign investors and contribute to growth and improvements in governance.  
Second, governments may wish to favour FDI that does not displace domestic firms 
(e.g., high technology industry) and/or that promotes linkages with local producers. The 
linkage may take the form of supply contracts, technology transfer, skill upgrading and 
training for labour. Targeted fiscal incentives for investment are one policy instrument, 
but these should not discriminate against domestic investors as it is also important to 
provide appropriate support to the development of domestic firms. Crowding out may 
be more likely if FDI is in the form of M&A activities, such as acquisitions of distressed 
banking and corporate assets in Thailand after 1997 (IMF 2003). Unlike greenfield   11
investment, this type of FDI does not directly contribute to physical capital or new 
linkages so is less likely to encourage crowding in (World Bank 2001).  
The analysis contributes to understanding the FDI and private investment relationship, 
and perhaps most importantly suggests that it may be unreasonable to expect both to 
increase together. Foreign investors, especially multinational firms, have advantages 
over domestic investors; typically, they have greater access to investment finance, 
technology and global markets. In any country, foreign investors will be in a stronger 
position to capture the best investment opportunities. In relatively low income countries 
with weak governance, domestic investors have an incentive to seek foreign partners 
(joint ventures may be a good option). As an economy grows and the quality of 
governance and institutions improves, it will be more attractive to foreign investors, but 
the need or incentive for domestic investors to seek foreign partners is lessened. In such 
an environment, to minimize adverse effects of crowding out the most important policy 
is to ensure opportunities for domestic investors to enable them to compete effectively 
for the best investment opportunities. In some cases this implies joint ventures, but more 
generally it implies that investment incentives do not discriminate against domestic 
investors. 
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Appendix A: data description 
The data covers 1995-2001 for 36 low or middle income countries3 chosen on the basis 
of data availability (countries for public investment and inflows of FDI, and period for 
governance data). Sample selection bias is possible as the middle income countries are 
over-represented in our sample (relative to the sample from which governance measures 
are taken), while low income countries are under-represented (see Appendix C). The 
period of analysis starts from 1995 as the governance data used (see below) are not 
available for earlier years. The countries consist of 13 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), 8 countries from Asia 
(Indonesia, India, Iran, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand), 10 countries from Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Turkey) and 5 African 
countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia). 
We measure the sources of finance as follows. Net inflows of FDI (in constant 2000 US 
dollars) adjusted by GDP (in constant 2000 US dollars) is the standard measure of FDI 
financing (Agosin and Machado 2005; Mišun and Tomšík 2002), expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. Private (non-guaranteed) long term external debt (in current US 
dollars adjusted by CPI for 2000 = 100) as a percentage of GDP is used as the measure 
of (private) foreign debt. Unfortunately, external debt data from the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not provide a measure of new private 
international borrowing so we do not have any direct measure of foreign debt financing 
(FDF). Similarly, as there is no direct measure of domestic capital-self financing (DSF), 
we calculate private investment (PV) as:  
PV = total investment – net inflows of FDI – public investment 
This represents domestic private investment however financed (it is not possible to 
distinguish domestic and foreign finance). Thus, PV is calculated from gross fixed 
capital formation minus net inflows of FDI and public investment, and is expressed as a 
percentage of GDP (where all measures are in current US dollars). 
Annual data over 1995-2001 are from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2004) and Government Finance Statistics (IMF 2005). GDP growth in constant 2000 
US dollars is the measure of market potential (Tuman and Emmert 1999; Gastanaga et 
al. 1998; Agosin and Machado 2005). 
Following recent studies (e.g., Hausmann and Fernández-Arias 2000), we utilize the 
World Bank’s governance indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2005) covering 209 countries for 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 to capture features of the political regimes for investment. 
The six governance indicators (GI) are based on information from cross-country surveys 
and polls of experts (e.g., Freedom House, World Economic Forum and European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development), and defined in Appendix B. Four of the 
governance measures are selected for analysis: voice and accountability (VA), political 
stability and absence of violence (PS), regulatory quality (RQ), and control of 
                                                 
3  The World Bank defines low or middle income countries as developing countries with 1995 per capita 
incomes of less than US$765 (low) and US$9,385 (middle) respectively.   15
corruption (CC). There is positive correlation among the measures, lowest for PS and 
RQ and around 0.7 for all other pairs (Görg et al. 2007, who also provide more 
discussion and analysis of the measures). Countries are classified as ‘good’ (favourable) 
and ‘bad’ (unfavourable) regimes for investment according to whether their average 
percentile rank (1996-2002) for the governance measures are ‘High’ (above the 50th 
percentile rank) or ‘Low’ (below the 50th percentile rank). 
Voice and accountability 
High: Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay 
Low: Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela  
Political stability 
High: Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Hungary, Jamaica, Kyrgyz Republic, Mauritius, Panama, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay 
Low: Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Moldova, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, 
Turkey 
Regulatory quality 
High: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Guatemala, Hungary, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uruguay  
Low: Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Romania, Senegal, Venezuela, Iran 
Control of corruption 
High: Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Mauritius, Peru, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay  
Low: Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kyrgyz Republic, Mexico, Moldova, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela 
To assess the relative importance of private investment (PV) and FDI in high and low 
countries, a two-sample t-test with different population variances is used. The tests are 
of the null hypotheses of no difference between means of PV and FDI (both measured 
as percentages of GDP) in the two sub-samples, against the alternative that the means 
are different. The results in Table A1 suggest that the levels of PV and FDI are typically 
greater under high as compared to low governance regimes for investment. An 
improvement of the governance measure encourages both private investment and FDI, 
in line with previous studies (Dawson 1998; Li and Resnick 2003). The average 
PV/GDP is considerably greater than FDI/GDP in all cases, and total (private) 
investment is higher under ‘favourable’ regimes for investment (high) as both levels of 
private investment and FDI are higher than those of the ‘unfavourable’ regime (low). 
Tables A2 and A3 provide summary statistics and correlations for the main variables.   16
Table A1: Difference in means of PV and FDI in different regimes 
Governance 
indicator 
PV/GDP FDI/GDP 
Mean S.D.  t  Mean S.D.  t 
high VA  15.72  5.44  2.54*  3.93  3.04  5.45* 
low  VA  14.09  4.66  2.15  2.13   
high PS  16.01  5.26  3.93*  3.49  3.01  2.20* 
low  PS  13.51  4.69  2.72  2.48   
high RQ  15.74  5.17  3.35*  3.71  2.94  5.15* 
low  RQ  13.46  4.86  2.01  2.13   
high CC  16.91  4.36  5.24*  3.48  2.71  1.69** 
low  CC  13.7  5.32  2.97  1.63   
 
Notes: S.D. is standard deviation and t is the value of the t-test for significance of differences in 
means, where * and ** indicate significant at 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively (two-tailed 
test). 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
Sample: 36 countries and 1995-2001 
Variable Mean  Max  Min S.D. 
PV/GDP 15.04  34.42  3.66  5.18 
FDI/GDP 3.19  12.88  -2.76  2.83 
GGDP 3.15  10.62  -13.12  3.71 
SDEBT/GDP 13.12  89.57  0.15  15.29 
PUB/GDP 3.06  16.69  0.01  2.48 
Source: World Bank (2004), IMF, and the author’s computation. 
 
Table A3: Correlations between main variables 
Sample: 36 countries and 1995-2001 
 PV/GDP  GGDP  SDEBT/GDP  FDI/GDP  PUB/GDP 
PV/GDP 1         
GGDP 0.19  1       
SDEBT/GDP 0.15  -0.01  1     
FDI/GDP -0.33  -0.05  0.10  1   
PUB/GDP -0.06 0.01  -0.06  -0.20  1 
Source: World Bank (2004), IMF, and the author’s computation. 
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Görg et al. (2007) investigate the relative importance of sources of financing of private 
investment under (un)favourable regimes for investment, by separately estimating the 
private investment and FDI equations following the model of Oshikoya (1994). The 
findings suggest that economic growth is a key determinant of FDI and private 
investment, but public investment and external debt have no significant effect. In both 
regimes for investment, private investment is relatively more important than FDI in 
terms of contribution to total investment. Total (private) investment is higher under 
market-friendly regimes for investment, supporting the argument that good governance 
and institutions stimulate total (private) investment in less-developed countries.    18
Appendix B: The World Bank’s governance indicators 
According to Kaufman et al. (2005), the World Bank’s governance indicators measure 
the following six dimensions of governance: 
1.  Voice and accountability – measuring the extent to which citizens of a country are 
able to participate in the selection of governments, and the independence of the 
media, which serves a significant role in monitoring those in authority and holding 
them accountable for their actions. 
2.  Political instability and violence – measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly 
unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
3.  Government effectiveness – focusing on inputs required for the government to be 
able to produce and implement good policies (the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies, for example) and deliver 
public goods.  
4.  Regulatory quality – measuring the incidence of market-friendly policy in areas 
such as foreign trade and business development. 
5.  Rule of law – measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society and the extent to which property rights are protected. These 
include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability 
of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
6.  Control of corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both grand corruption and state capture. 
The indicators cover 209 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. 
They are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of 
governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different 
organizations such as Freedom House, World Economic Forum, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and so forth.  
An unobserved components model – providing estimates of governance for each 
country and measures of the precision of these estimates for every country, indicator 
and year – is employed to construct the six aggregate governance indicators in each 
period. The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one in each period. This implies that virtually all scores lie 
between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes (the World 
Bank also shows point estimates in percentile rank). Table B1 presents comparison for 
all six governance indicators across the 36 countries.    19
Table B1: Governance indicators for 36 developing countries  
Country 
Average percentile rank (1996-2002) 
Voice and 
accountability 
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Government 
effectiveness 
Regulatory 
quality 
Rule of 
law 
Control of 
corruption
Argentina 61.4  54.7  62.4 62.8  54.3  46.0 
Bolivia 55.7  41.8  40.2 72.1  34.9  29.9 
Bulgaria 62.1  59.8  39.0 58.6  54.5  44.1 
Chile 72.2  75.8  86.8  91.9  86.0  88.4 
Costa Rica  87.7  84.8  71.7 79.4  75.6  81.5 
Côte d’lvoire 25.3  30.8  36.8  41.5  25.7  42.4 
Croatia 49.3  62.2  62.6 57.0  52.5  51.0 
Czech Republic  78.1  82.7 77.9  79.9  72.9  72.5 
El Salvador  51.1  55.2 46.0  80.3  43.3  43.0 
Estonia 73.5  78.4  77.6 88.0  71.8  72.8 
Guatemala 35.9 20.5 34.9 63.1  25.5  27.0 
Hungary 82.9  81.1  77.6 83.8  76.9  78.0 
India 60.7  26.2  53.6 42.0  60.3  49.0 
Indonesia 23.8  13.0  41.8 42.3  21.9  15.9 
Iran, Islamic 
Republic 
21.7 34.1  43.3  8.1  33.4  32.2 
Jamaica 66.4  52.1  42.4  68.9  47.8  47.1 
Kyrgyz Republic  29.5  52.0  33.2  32.7  24.4  23.1 
Mauritius 76.3  88.5  75.0 67.4  78.7  73.5 
Mexico 50.5  38.8  64.4  73.2  46.9  44.4 
Moldova 46.5  44.8  26.7 36.1  43.4  32.7 
Pakistan 19.1  16.9  31.6 27.4  31.3  20.1 
Panama 64.3  61.8  49.9 80.5  59.5  45.5 
Paraguay 35.7  28.6  11.6 39.3  22.3  14.4 
Peru 39.3  24.9  51.5  73.3  38.2  55.9 
Philippines 58.8 38.9 63.2 65.0  47.3  42.5 
Poland 80.0  73.0  75.4 72.7  71.0  72.7 
Romania 58.6  57.0  32.8  44.9  49.4  45.2 
Senegal 45.6  23.4  55.7 38.9  50.0  43.4 
Slovak Republic  68.4  74.6 66.1  64.9  63.7  67.0 
South Africa  72.7  29.2 69.2  61.4  64.1  73.4 
Sri Lanka  42.4  9.1  46.4 65.5  58.5  54.6 
Thailand 55.7  57.8  66.7 67.0  67.4  48.0 
Tunisia 25.6  61.9  79.4 59.6  65.0  68.8 
Turkey 30.8  16.5  52.9  65.6  59.3  54.2 
Uruguay 74.7  77.3  75.3 80.5  71.5  76.4 
Venezuela, Republic 47.1 26.2  15.8 37.5  24.3  24.3 
Source: World Bank – http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/   20
Appendix C: Sample selection bias 
The tables below present the proportions of our sample in high/low governance that are 
middle/low income countries as compared to respective proportions in population of 
countries with governance data. Compared to the population, middle income countries, 
specifically for ‘high’ governance countries, are over-represented in our sample, 
whereas low income countries are under-represented, especially for ‘low’ governance 
countries. 
Voice and accountability 
  Kaufman et al. (2005)  Sample 
‘High’  ‘Low’  ‘High’  ‘Low’ 
Middle income country  34.7%  30.7%  55.6%  30.6% 
Low income country  5.3% 29.3%  2.8%  11% 
Political stability and absence of violence 
  Kaufman et al. (2005)  Sample 
‘High’  ‘Low’  ‘High’  ‘Low’ 
Middle income country  27.7%  35.8%  50%  36.1% 
Low income country  3.4% 33.1%  2.8%  11.1% 
Regulatory quality 
  Kaufman et al. (2005)  Sample 
‘High’  ‘Low’  ‘High’  ‘Low’ 
Middle income country  28.9%  36.9%  66.7%  19.4% 
Low income country  0.7% 33.5%  0% 13.9% 
Control of corruption 
  Kaufman et al. (2005)  Sample 
‘High’  ‘Low’  ‘High’  ‘Low’ 
Middle income country  24.2%  41.6%  41.7%  44.4% 
Low income country  1.3% 32.9%  0% 13.9% 
 